

RELATED: These are the 10 most essential VPN features you’ll want!Īn additional step would be to speak to customer support and ask them about their logging policy – although I doubt many people will go this far. (Note: I do feel ExpressVPN could be a little more transparent on the information they log).
#Expressvpn logs full
On ExpressVPN’s website for example, (click here for my full review of ExpressVPN), you can see what information the provider does and does not collect. Quality VPNs should also have dedicated pages towards logging. They also promise to keep only a maximum of 20 records prior to deletion. I picked on Astrill earlier, so I feel like I owe it to them in stating that they clearly mention on their FAQ page that they keep track of: To find the real VPN logging policies, start by reviewing a VPN company’s privacy policy page and/or scanning their FAQ page.
#Expressvpn logs how to
How to Find a VPN’s REAL Data Logging Policy Therefore, rather than looking for a VPN service that keeps no data logs – because there isn’t a zero log VPN that does this – look for VPNs that keep minimal logs and are transparent about it. VPNs that log this type of data are the ones you want to avoid.


You see, even if a VPN claims to abide by a “zero log” policy, it is virtually impossible to independently verify. There’s one problem when it comes to these no log VPNs. It further appears that, while v7.1.9 was what was listed on the store, those who had the hostile v7.1.8 installed did NOT automatically receive the malware-removing update, and continued running the hostile code until Google force-disabled the extension.Note: Some of the links in this article are affiliate links, which means that at no extra cost to you, I may be compensated if you choose to use one of the services listed.
#Expressvpn logs update
However, the malicious maintainer remains in control, however, and can introduce an update at any time. After Microsoft removed it from Edge for malware, v7.1.9 was created without this code: that has been the code distributed by the web store since November, and it does not appear to load the compromised script. In v7.1.8 of the extension (published to the web store but NOT to GitHub), arbitrary code was executed from a remote server, which appeared to be used to commit a variety of tracking and fraud actions. TLDR: The old maintainer appears to have sold the extension to parties unknown, who have malicious intent to exploit the users of this extension in advertising fraud, tracking, and more.
